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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

CALVIN K. FLORENCE
Plaintiff-Appellant

Case No. 20813

vs,

DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. HOLMES,
HOLMES, HOLMES REALTY, a Utah
Corporation, JAMES R. GADDIS,
GADDIS INVESTMENTS, a Utah
Corporation,
(Dewayne Iverson,
Defendant-REspondent),
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Florence, claims one third of a real estate commission paid to the defendants for the sale of certain multiple unit
real property on the basis of an express oral contract with the defendant Iverson and also on the basis that there is a custom and trade
practice in the real estate brokerage profession to divide fees equally
when more than one broker is involved in a real estate sales project.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER

COURT

The defendants James R. Gaddis and Gaddis Investments were
dismissed out on summary judgment on the grounds that they were not a
party to the subject oral contract.
The defendant DeWayne Iverson

moved

That dismissal was not appealed.
for a summary judgment and the

trial judge granted that motion.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintff-Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court
order dismissing this suit as to the defendant Iverson.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August 1983 James R. Gaddis approached Plaintiff for
the purpose of obtaining all the information plaintiff had regarding
certain types of income producing property a client of the defendant
Gaddis Investment Company wanted to acquire.
Plaintiff responded to the aforesaid inquiry that he had no
clients that had such property but he knew of a real estate salesman
who did.
Plaintiff then requested such information from the defendant
DeWayne Iverson who said that he would not disclose the identity of
his clients owning such property unless the broker requesting the information agreed in writing to divide any commission on the contemplated
purchase three ways.
ant James Gaddis

Plaintiff obtained such a letter from the defendand asked for and received an assurance from the

other defendant that there would be a three way split on any real estate
commission that was earned as a result of any sale effected as a result
of the joint efforts of Gaddis Investment and DelMyne Iverson.
The client of the Defendant James R. Gaddis and Gaddis
Investment referred to above purchased certain property for over
$4,500,000 and the owner thereof paid a real estate commission of
$200,000.

There is an implied agreement arising from the custon and
trade practices in the real estate brokerage profession to divide fees
equally when more than one broker is involved in a real estate sales
project. Defendants refused to divide the commission with plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1. Whether or not there

was an enforceable oral contract.

2. Whether there was a genuine dispute factually as to the
above issue and of the existence of a custom and trade practice in
the real estate brokerage business to imply a contract to divide commissions equally when three brokers were involved.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is error for the lower court to grant a motion for
summary judgment when there is a genuine dispute as to material facts.

ARGUMENTS
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WHEN THE RECORD SHOWED THAT THERE
WAS A GENUINE DISPUTE WITH RESPECT TO TWO
MATERIAL FACTS, TO WIT: (1) WHETHER THERE
WAS AN ENFORCEABLE ORAL CONTRACT (2) WHETHER
THERE WAS A TRADE AND BUSINESS PRACTICE TO
DIVIDE REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS EQUALLY UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
In the respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment at page 3, his counsel states (par.7) "When brokers
split commissions it is as likely that there will

be an uneven division

of the commission as that there will be an even division.

One cannot

say by community practice what the division will be (Deposition page
43)".

Even if the concession that an even division (appellant's

position) is as likely as an uneven one (respondent takes position no
division - even an unequal - is required) was not sufficient to bar
summary disposition, as appellant claims it should, there was before
the Court the affidavit of Bernard C. Fallentine, a licensed real
estate broker of this State for over ten years that the custom even
in the absence of a written agreement is to divide the commissions
equally if more than two brokers are involved "in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary".

(R.79).

This evidence which supports

appellants claim certainly

creates the type of dispute that requires an evidentiary hearing and
precludes the granting of a motion for summary judgment.
(1.

Utah R.Civ.P. 56 (c); Hall v. Fitzgerald, Utah.
671 P.2d 224, 226 (198371

2.

McBride v. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 431, 432 (1980).

3.

Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). )

Respondent successfully urged the trial court to make
an exception to the well settled rules of summary judgment on two
grounds:

(1) appeallants services were complete before he exacted

the promise of respondent to share his commission whether it was the
Karen Lee Apartments or any other that were sold to the "hot buyer"
(R 62 and (2) the defendant Gaddis had been dismissed out and the
respondent Iverson "stands in no different position than Gaddis in
relation to plaintiff insofar as the claimed implied agreement is
concerned (Deposition page 41-44)".

(R 67).

As for (1), it is factually not so. Appellant brought
Iverson and Gaddis together after the conversation appellant had with
Iverson when he delivered the letter of August 26, 1983 (R 69). This
is very clear from the quotation respondent made from appellant's
deposition (R 62) which occurred on the morning that letter was dated.
"I said 'Great, take it to Gaddis and let him do what he wants with
the Karen Lee'." At its strongest, the reference by respondent's
counsel to "the morning of the 26th" created a dispute as to whether
it took place on the 25th (as respondent concedes on the first line of
R62) or the 26th.

In any event the facts to establish a lack of con-

sideration (a defense which requires an affirmative pleading which was
not made by respondent) are not conclusively established in the record
so as to permit the granting of a summary judgment on that ground.
As for (2), the positions of defendants at the time the
respective motions for summary judgment were granted were as opposite
as they could be. Gaddis' motion was based solely on the grounds that

they were not parties to the oral contract which is the first basis for
plaintiff's suit (appellant conceded such to be the case).
second basis, appellant was not then

As for the

armed with an affidavit to

establish the business custom and trade practice when the Gaddis motion
was heard on February 12, 1985. When the Iverson motion

was heard on

May 2, 1985, the affidavit establishing the business practice was before the Court (R 79).
CONCLUSION
There is a clear and genuine dispute as to at least two
material facts which should have pre-cluded the granting of summary
judgment in this case, to wit:

(1) whether there was a valid oral

contract to divide commissions three ways (2) whether there was an
applicable business and trade practice to divide real estate commissions
chree ways under the facts of this case.
The summary judgment granted respondent in this case should
be vacated and the case tried on its merits.
Respectfully submitted this

9th

day of October, 198fi,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Appellant.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief
was mailed, postage prepaid, this
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN K. FLORENCE,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E.
HOLMES, HOLMES REALTY, a Utah
corporation, JAMES R. GADDIS,
GADDIS INVESTMENTS, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C84-5760
Judge Dean E. Conder

Defendants.
Defendants James R. Gaddis and Gaddis Investments
hereby jointly move the Court under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure for summary judgment in their favor.

The grounds

for this motion are as follows:
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE AN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GADDIS AND PLAINTIFF
1.

Plaintiff's Complaint herein alleges an agreement

whereby plaintiff was promised one third of any real estate
broker's commission "that was earned as a result of any sale
effected as a result of the joint efforts of Gaddis Investment

and DeWayne Iverson."

Plaintiff's Complaint, 1(8. The Complaint

prays for judgment entitling plaintiff to his alleged share of a
commission paid in connection with the sale of the Brittany
Apartments*

Plaintiff's Complaint, 1MI 10, 11.

2.

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that defen-

dants James R. Gaddis and/or Gaddis Investments were a party to
any such agreement.

The complaint alleges only that "plaintiff

asked for and received an assurance from said defendant [DeWayne
Iverson] that there would be a three way split on any real estate
commission that was earned as a result of any sale effected as a
result of the joint efforts of Gaddis Investment and DeWayne
Iverson."

Plaintiff's Complaint, 1|8. The Complaint alleges only

that defendant Iversoh, not defendants Gaddis, made this promise
to plaintiff.
PLAINTIFF HAS ADMITTED THAT HE J1AD NO
AGREEMENT^WITH GADPfs WITH RESPECT
TO THE BRITTANY APARTMENTS
3.

Even assuming an agreement between plaintiff, on

the one hand, and defendants James R. Gaddis and/or Gaddis
Investments, on the other hand, such agreement provided only that
defendants Gaddis and Iverson would split the real estate commission with plaintiff if Gaddis' client purchased the Karen Lee
Apartments.

Gaddis' client never purchased the Karen Lee

Apartments.

Gaddis' client purchased the Brittany Apartments and

plaintiff has not alleged an agreement between Gaddis and plaintiff with respect to the Brittany Apartments.

4.

The only basis for an agreement between plaintiff,

on the one hand, and defendants Gaddis, on the other hand, is
found in a letter marked as Exhibit 1 to the deposition of
plaintiff:
Q. Do you have any agreement with Mr* Gaddis
other than this agreement that is contained
in Exhibit 1?
A.

No.

Florence Depo., 12-13-84, at 29.

Copies of the relevant pages of

this deposition, along with Exhibit 1, are attached hereto for
the Court's convenience.
5.

Plaintiff has admitted that his agreement with

Gaddis related solely to the Karen Lee Apartments:
Q. So the purpose and reason for Exhibit 1
was to insure that once Mr. Iverson disclosed
the name of the Karen Lee Apartments, that
Mr. Iverson and you would deceive a commission if the sale of those apartments was
consummated. Is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And nothing else; correct?

A.

As far as I know.

Id., at 30-31.
6.

Plaintiff admitted that he did absolutely nothing

with respect to the transaction regarding the Brittany
Apartments:
Q. With respect to the'Brittany Apartment
transaction, you did absolutely nothing.
Isn't that a fact?
A.

I was never requested to do so, no.

Q.

So The answer is no?

A,

The answer is no.

Id., at 46.
This motion should be granted because plaintiff has
failed to allege that defendants Gaddis are a party to the agreement sued on.

Moreover, plaintiff is now precluded from making

such an allegation because he has admitted that he had no agreement with Gaddis with respect to the Brittany Apartments.

The

only agreement produced and testified to by plaintiff relates to
the Karen Lee Apartments; a property that was never sold and for
which commissions were never paid.
This motion is based upon the files and pleadings
herein.

Because it is relied on herein, defendants Gaddis hereby

request that the deposition of plaintiff Calvin Florence be
published for purposes of this motion.
DATED this

lty

day of January, 1985.
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR

By

1(M%

'2* / ^ 4 -

Thomas B. Green
Attorneys for Defendants
James R. Gaddis and
Gaddis Investments

EARL D. TANNER
#3188
EARL D. TANNER, JR. #3187
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2021
Attorneys for Defendant Iverson
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN K. FLORENCE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]1

MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]

DEWAYNE IVERSON, et al.,

]1

Civil No. C84-5760
(Judge Dean E. Condor)

Defendants.
Defendant DeWayne Iverson, through his counsel, hereby
moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, for entry of summary judgment of no cause of action ir
his favor, and against plaintiff Calvin K. Florence.
This motion is based upon the file herein, the
deposition of the plaintiff, and the Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith.
DATED this 16th day of April, 1985.
EARL D. TANNER
EARL D. TANNER, JR.
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER

A F F I D A V I T

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

'jss
)

BERNARD C. FALLENTINE, being first duly

sworn upon his

oath deposes and says:
1.

He is a real estate broker licensed by the State of

Utah and has been continuously for the past ten years.
2.

There is a custom and practice among real estate

brokers in the State of Utah to equally divide any real estate
commissions paid by the sellers or buyers of real estate even in
the absence of any written or oral contract to that effect but
subject to modification by any such contracts.
3.

If more than two real estate brokers are involved in

real estate sales the commissions are equal shares for all who are
involved in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Dated this

/*

day of l l f l t Z g

,1985.

r

J^UL,

IRNARD C. FALLENTINE

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/ ^ '

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission expires:

Residing at Salt Lake C i t y , Utah

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt lake County Utah

EARL D. TANNER
#3187
BRAD L ENGLUND
#4478
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER
1020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2021

JUN27 1985
?3rti Diet. Court

Attorneys for Defendant Iverrson
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CALVIN K. FLORENCE,
Plaintiff,

O R D E R

vs.
DEWAYNE IVERSON, et al.,

Civil No. C84-5760
Judge Dean E. Conder

Defendants.
Defendant DeWayne Iverson's Mo.tion for Summairy Judgment
came on regularly for hearing before the Court on May 2, 1985;
Earl D. Tanner appearing for defendant Iverson and Robert R.
Hansen appearing for plaintiff.

The Court having considered said

motion, and being fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's objection to the
proffer by plaintiff of a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment with accompanying affidavit be sustained as said
documents were not timely filed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant DeWayne Iverson1s
Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 16, 1985 be and the same
is hereby granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of the claims and causes
of action against defendant Iverson asserted in plaintiff's
Complaint dated September 27, 1984 herein be and the same are
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon their merits*
DATED this

^

7 day of June, 1985.
RY THE COURT:

Honorable Dean E« Conder
District Judge

ATTEST
H DIXON HiHDLSY

